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KATERINA PLAKITSr - VASILIS KOKKOTAS
REFLECTIVE, INFORMAL AND NON - LINEAR ASPECTS 
OF ARGUMENTATION IN SCHOOL PRACTICE
SUMMARY
This study continues a previous one (Plakitsi, Kokkotas, 2003) on 
the ways of argument in primary science school classroom. According 
to our point of view, argumentation, is not a matter of application of 
pre-existing rules (scholastic approach), but the thematic and normative 
perhaps, but most of all, critical self-examination of thought (inter­
pretative approach). We studied pupils' (10-12 years) arguments du­
ring their dialogues in classroom. We used D.Waltons(1996) argumenta­
tion schema and also we agree with his assertion that different standards 
for evaluating argument apply to different types of dialogue. Further­
more, we analysed pupils' argumentative operations according to the 
context provided by Pontecorvo & Girardet (1993) in relation with 
that provided by Resnick et. al (1993). We made discourse analysis 
and also we studied interaction features in accordance to Roth's (1995) 
categorization. Finally, we recorded pupils' socio-cogniti ve roles.
KEYWORDS: argument, informal logic, dialogues.
INT RODUCTION
Culture and value as factors of the birth and interpretation of science.
The main characteristics of the empiricist epistemology are its 
psychologism, the consequent ignorance and neglect of ontology, and 
the formalistic and monosemic concept of truth. Language is a closed 
set of descriptive propositions, which from the axioms of the given 
theory in a formal way. The subject is the passive receptor of sense - 
data and the valid statements are "verified” individually or separately 
in the group of the scientists that accept the principles of the given 
paradigm.
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The weak point of this opinion is its philosophical one - sideness. 
This approach stubbornly ignores the wealth of the social sciences and 
the humanities, and identifies philosophy of science with the follo­
wing of the tradition of the Circle of Vienna and its non fruitful inter­
pretation of late Wittgenstein, pragmatism and post war epistemology. 
According to our point of view the crisis of logical positivism is a crisis 
of the utilitarian, individualist style of life, and the civilization that 
born it.
As pointed G.H. Mead, in an early article, man is not a passive 
imitator, but the imitative processes presuppose social instincts (Mead, 
2001). The consequence of this thesis is that sociality and inter - sybje- 
ctive interaction! estabish the root of all the activity of humanity. The 
social self is immediate and active. From his own side the contempo­
rary German philosopher M. Frank shown that the subject is not the 
sensory data, the Humean "bundle of perceptions”, but a bundle of 
polysémie interpretative versions which are enacted in the field of 
culture (Frank, 1988).
This poses another approach to language. It is not formed in deno­
ting processes, but it is a living organism formed in the communicative 
activities of mankind. Thus polysemy emanates not from "analytical” 
definitions, but is a practice posited by culture and communication 
in actu. Much earlier than the adherents of the analytical philosophy 
of language, Dilthey wrote: "...we are forced by the nature of the 
linguistic process to use metaphors. Metaphors are also used in science. 
What has been narrated is then put forward as an instance, another 
instance is placed beside it, and through them a universal is exhibited” 
(Dilthey, 1996).
Viewed ontologically science is the study of beings in the world. 
This does not eliminate, but posits the polysémie approach from an 
ontic stance. Aristotle beginning his Physics writes that "being is utte­
red in many ways” (Aristotle, Physics A 185a 21). As Heidegger com­
ments, from this passage follows as its consequence that the "in many 
ways spoken being”, is spoken by the means of analogy (Heidegger, 
1991). The ontological root of science, distinguishes, according to Jonas, 
nature as the birth place of values for man (Jonas, 1990), not reified 
according to our approach since values are not material objects, but 
consist in the wishful stances of mankind. Naturre is presupposed by 
science and culture and society, but on the other side, from the point 
of view of its historical beginnings, culture and society are the birth
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place of natural sciences. According to K - 0 Apel, "what is comple­
mentary to the objectivity of science, it is not, or at least not only, 
the subjectivity of the irrational axiological desision. But, it is, equally, 
the inter - subjective validity of the moral norms of the community” 
(K - 0 Apel, 1994). Thus, although the descriptive function of science 
is objective and, in this sense axiologically "neutral”, sciencs cannot 
contain its historical presuppositions, from the point of view of an 
priori cultural factor, but the social and cultural aspects are presup­
posed by the process of its interpretation.
ARGUMENT IN EPISTEMOLOGY:
Reflection, reasoning, and the limits of the normative approach.
We distinguish two approaches to argumentation. The first, whose 
most characteristic exponent is B. Russell, views it as a system of 
formal rules. But accordindg to our opinion, it is self - contradictory, 
if we view the prob[em of its substantiation as a normative one, since 
if reason consist in a closed system of rules, it must be proved either 
by itself or by another set of rules. In the first case we are led to a vi­
cious circle. If on the other hand, this "proof” proceeds by another 
set of rules, these ryles are not exclusive.
Already by the end of 19th century and the beginning of the 20th 
Peirce radically changed the landscape in this article of 1906, "The 
Basis of Pragmaticism in the Normative Sciences” (Peirce, 1998), where 
he states that logic is a science "of conceiving and has nothing to do 
with the means where by the conceiving is performed”, inaugurating, 
what we shall call the interpretative approach to reasoning and, spea­
king generally of reflection. An outcome of this is that logic is not a 
set of rules, but consists in the path of the critical self - examination 
of thought, where thought is approached as a totality of interpretative 
symbols. A major contribution of Peirce to the contemporary philo­
sophy is the connection of Peirce (vide his lecture "Pragmatism”), of 
the interpretation of symbols, with the interpretation of minds as 
"theaters of consciousness” which interact the one with the other, and 
whose interactions is presupposed by any descriptive process. We state 
the last conclusion based on his position, expressed in the same lecture 
that "the Object of a Sign. .. is necessarily unexpressed by the sign, 
taken by itself” (Peirce op. cit..). Another conclusion we may reach, is 
that as states Ricoeur, the sign is "a supposition and not an assertion”
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(Ricoeur, 1984). Thus the sign accomplishes an interplay between dissi­
mulation and elicitation of a thought. In this sense the principle of 
thought cannot be "revelation”, and interpretation is a presupposition 
of truth-functional semantics.
From his point of view von Glasersfeld argues that the commu­
nication is not the original deciphering of the, say, original meaning 
of the words. He rather states that the signals involved in it "carry 
instructions to select particular meanings from a list which together 
with the lists of the convened signals, constitute the communication 
code” (von Glasersfeld, 1995). In this sense, according to him, the 
communicational processes are normative, while from his own, psycho­
logical, point of view he agrees with Ricoeur that psychological inter­
pretation is not pre-given. But we would be led to the scholastic dead­
lock, in case we thought that this code is universal and that it exists 
before the communicational process. Consequently we disagree with 
the point of view of Sperber andWilson, according to which information 
is the presupposition of communication (Sperber, Wilson, 1989). For 
us communication is not a predictable process, but a process under 
construct!on.What objectifies it, is the fact that it is always actualized 
in the field of language and in this sense we agree with Plato that reason 
is the discursive combination of nouns and verbs (Plato, Seventh Epistle 
342b). But most of all: reflexivity does not consist in normativity in 
abstracto, but as formulates Willke, with the self - thematization of 
systems involved in it (Willke, 1996).
Argument is a process evolving in time. We will perform a mild 
distinction between thought and language, always viewing the second 
as the implementation of discourse and inter-subjectivity. In this 
sense it consists in a serial combination of morphemes, while from the 
other point of view is not deterministically predictable. Depraz, Varela 
and Vermesch define non-linearity as bifurcation, limit-time oscilla­
tions and chaos (Depraz, Varela, Vermesch, 2003). And, even from the 
point of view of its agent, communication is always risky, since, during 
it comprehension, is not pre-given.
The learning subjects are always posited in the world as psycho­
physical entities, they are continuously elaborating information from 
it, and thus their cognitive status connot be immobilized in a permanent 
condition. We cannot ignore the functionalist thesis about the equili­
bration of the cognitive processes, but according to our opinion it is 
not fruitful, to view it as procedure of stabilization though time (Pia-
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get, 1988). We meet this opinion and in Ashby’s "Design for a Brain”: 
in this book he connected equilibrium with recursineness and normality 
and as a characteristics of adaptation to the environment (Ashby, 
1965). But adaptation presupposes a flexible latent mechanism, which 
buttresses the evolution of the given system, and its capacity to self- 
differentiate, and interact with any other system that surrounds it. 
It presupposes additionally the capacity of the cognitive system to 
observe and be self-observed, but also interact with the other relative 
natural, biological and social systems related to it. Thus it is necessary, 
according to our opinion, a shift of interest of the research from the 
field of functionalism and "strict” constructivism to those of the various 
"traditions”of social, philosophical and cultural hermeneutics. The 
learnign process involves active learning subjects, necessitates their 
interaction, and is "enacted” upon inter-subjectivity, language, and 
civilization (Varela, Thompson, Roseli, 1993); and proceeds through 
the, not only first and third person interaction, but in the second person 
too (Depraz et. al. op. cit., 2003).
ARGUMENT IN PEDAGOGY AND IN EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH 
AS WELL
Argument in pedagogy:
Argument usually is: "rhetorical”(Billing, 1996) or "didactical” 
(teacher offers data in order to help pupils to consider a justification 
as logical or "triadic discourse” (Teacher question-Pupil answer-Teacher 
evaluation) (Kuhn, 1997 -Lemke, 1990). There is luck of "dialectical” 
or "multi-thematic” or "polyporphous” arguments, that is to say mu­
ltidimensional reasoning in order to construct a common answer. Some 
consequences of that luck are: 1) pupils hold wrong aspects about 
science; 2) they have difficulties to learn science and to participate 
in real discourses. According to our point of view, the most important 
problem of this situation is that pupils become familiar with linear 
reasoning even if the topic they have to study is multisemic. On the 
other side, rich dialogues, and also rich arguments support polysemy 
(or multiplicity) which is a substantial characteristic of real socio- 
scientific topics. Nowadays, scientific communities mostly search for 
non-linear analysis of the everyday life and environmental problems. 
But, we consider a challenge to define to what extent that non-linea­
rity is necessary to be included in our educational system. For example 
a fundamental interdisciplinary concept is the concept of time. Time
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is linear and cyclic; time is psychological, biological, and physical; 
time is internal and also external. So pupils have to reconcile their 
personal (subjective) conceptual system to the conventional (objective) 
system of the socio-culture context where they grow up.
Learning theories supporting our research are:
— Social constructivism: learning is at first 'cross-individual’ and 
then 'inter-individual’ (Vygotsky, 1978, Wertsch, 1985).
— Situated- learning theory (Brown et ah, 1989, Lave, Wenger, 
1990): learning is defined by action, context and culture when 
in takes place.
— "Authentic” learning environments, that make "meaning”, 
"purpose” and "interrelation” (Roth, 1995).
— Social interaction in learning communities (Miller,1997).
Argument in educational Research:
— Up to now argument has been studied in relation to: 1) conce­
ptualization -conceptual change, 2) pupils’ epistemological ideas, 
pupils’ learning difficulties and, 4) skills develoment. Recently 
research focuses into the process of argument construction 
itself. But, there are not so many data about the reasoning 
process and argument construction in small groups and also 
within different congitive contexts (Kelly, 1997, 1998).
Argumentation in our research.
— We believe that argumentation among pupils is an important 
strategy in the process of learning.
— Furthermore, we considered scientific knowledge as argumenta­
tion: the ability of construction, justification and evaluation 
of scientific claims (D. Kuhn, 1993).
— We choose a sequence of "authentic” discourses and "academic 
controversies” as "open environments”.
— We examined pupils’ scientific thought and also the processes 
of argument construction in small groups discoures.
Dialogic procedure occurs during dialectical argumentative ex­
changes, like that which occusr during collaborative small group science 
investigations, assessment conversations (Jimenez- Alexandre, et al, 
1997). The discourse is typically focused on one or more advocated 
positions. Argumentation schemes that focus on presumptive reasoning 
focus on the evidence and premises a person uses to shift the burden
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of proof from one advocate to another (Walton, 1996). Our analysis 
of small group discourse supports the use of presumptive reasoning as 
a framework to analyse students’ argumentation. Further justification 
and elaboration of presumptive reasoning as an analytical tool is pro­
vided in the next section.
METHODOLOGY
Discourse of Argument analysis.
We studied some dialogues from 6 small groups of pupils, 10-12 
years, while they were studying science in two schools of Athens, during 
the winter of 2003. Firstly, we took into consideration D. Walton’s 
(1996) argumentation schema, trying to find an appropriate tool in order 
to analyse pupils’ arguments while they argue about linear and cyclic 
time. In our previous work (Plakitsi, Kokkotas et al. 2003) we used 
Toulmin’s Argument Pattern (TAP) in order to analyse analytical argu­
ments emerging in multi-dimensional dialogues in classroom. Toulmin, 
in his book «The Uses of Argument» (Toulmin, 1958), radicalising, 
according to our opinion, the pragmatist approach, writes that premi­
ses linked to conclusions, are supported by general heuristics, offered 
in support of claims, he dubs «warrants».
In this study we tried to use D. Walton’s Argumentation schemes 
for presumptive reasoning (1996). We supposed that a Walton’s schema 
would be more appropriate tool in order to study dialectical arguments. 
In his New Dialectic (1998)Walton asserts that different standards for 
evaluating argument apply to different types of dialogue. An informal 
logic that is pragmatic and contextual, he maintains, works best for 
evaluating arguments that arise in everyday conversational exchanges. 
Walton’s major innovation is to see a fallacy not as a general pattern 
of argument. What is a non-fallacious type of argument in one context 
of discussion may be fallacious in another. According to our point of 
view, and despite its undeniable usefulness, the new dialectic must at 
times founder in the face of the unruliness and recalcitrance of ordi­
nary language.
The teaching and learning strategies were: a) discourses in small 
groups (initial phase of the research) and an academic controversy (last 
phase) about linear and cyclic time. According to our opinion, philo­
sophical background of those strategies is Gadamer’s (1978) game 
metaphor. He has suggested that every dialogue can be seen as a form 
of a game. Like a game, a conversation has a momentum of its own,
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which carries it forward. Gadamer’s point is caught in Quincey’s meta­
phor of the "vast tennis-court of conversation, where the ball is flying 
backwards and forwards” ("Conversation”, 422). People who argue 
must agree upon far more than they disagree about. Mainly, they must 
agree about the rules of play. In practical, we choose the type of aca— 
demie controversy proposed by Johnson & Johnson, 1995. This type 
has the following five steps:
— Organizing Information and deriving conclusions: Pupils rese­
arch a position, learn the relevant information, and prepare 
a persuasive «best case possible» for the position.
— Presenting and advocating positions: Pupils present in a persu­
asive and convincing way the «best case possible» for their 
position.
— Uncertainty created by being challenged by opposing views: 
Pupils engage in an open discussion, in which they argue force­
fully for their position, refute the opposing position, and rebut 
attaks on their position.
— Epistemic curiosity and perspective talking: Pupils reverse per­
spectives and present the opposing position as accurately, 
completely, persuasively, and forcefully as they can.
— Reconceptualizing, synthesizing, and intergrating: Pupils drop 
all advocacies, create a synthesis or intergration of the opposing 
positions, and reach a consensus on the best reasoned judgment 
that may be made about the issue.
Data were a) groups’ worksheets, 2) taped discourses and, 3) video­
tapes of the final academic controversy. For discourse analysis, at 
first, we de-record the tapes and the videos. Afterwards, we analyzed 
pupils’ arguments using Walton’s Argumentation Schemes for Pre­
sumptive Reasoning. Other researchers supported that their initial 
attempts to use Toulmin’s Argument Pattern for the analysis of discourse 
did not prove useful (Duschl, Ellenbogen & Erduran, 1999). In spite 
of this we found TAP useful and functional for studying argumentation 
schemes in elementary schooml classrooms. For all that, designed to 
test another, contemporary, tool. Besides, the use of Walton’s presum­
ptive reasoning schemes more adequately fit the dialectical structure 
of the group discourse and the kind of evidence and premises students 
generate. Eight of the 25 argumentation schemes proposed by Walton 
were selected for the analysis of the reasoning units. The selected schemes
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are presented in Table 1, in 4 collapsed categories. Given the emphasis 
on dialog, the unit of analysis was the reasoning sequence. The rea­
soning sequences is the conversation that takes place between group 
members when debating or arguing for, or against, a specific course 
of action or when evaluating a patricular claim.
Argumentative operations.
Beyond the argument structure there are argumentative operations. 
These are a means that speakers use for expressing and supporting their 
reasoning. From the context provided by Pontecorvo & Girardet (1993) 
in relation with that provided by Resnick et. al (1993), we coded argu­
mentative operations into the following categories:
— claim: every proposition that exposes a thesis /situation, wi­
thout any definitely answer to the matter.
— justification: every proposition that supports a claim (either 
towards a consensus or to a contradiction).
— consession: every proposition that accepts a previous idea (i.e. 
confirms a claim or a justification).
— opposition: every proposition that denies a previous idea (i.e. 
rejects a claim or a justification).
— challenge: every proposition that works as a demand for justi­
fication /demand for investigation / indirect controversy.
RESULTS / CONCLUSIONS
Children’s thought is influenced by cognitive, but also intuitive 
factors. In this sense, although their development passes through evo­
lutionary phases, it is not, concerning its initial phases, homogenously 
predictable. The non thematic factors form the background of the 
argument. In this sense, the argument does not appear isolated, but 
is multithematic and polymorphous. Thus children synthesize their 
views, and reach the conclusion that «time is linear and cyclic at the 
same time».
The articulation of children thought and their argumentation is 
not organized in a linear and unanimous way. Thought, at least when 
it is controllable by formal criteria, is always articulated, but its arti­
culation is self-productive and self-reproductive.
Thought, as we stated before, is not monologic, but discursive 
and dialectical. This opinion has, especially for education a significant
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sociological aspect, according to the assertion that "the first logical 
categories are social cartegories”( Durkheim, Mauss, 2001). Discussion 
is needed for another reason: it is the only way by which the pupils 
can learn the scientific way of thought and be committed to it.
As far as is concerned to argumentative operations:
— During the discourse and in each turn when the speakers were 
exchanging messages (message units) we recorded:
(claim + justification) —y (opposition) —y (opposition) —y (oppo­
sition) challenge —y (claim + justification) —y .... —y (oppo­
sition) -y (opposition)..................... -y consession.
— Pupils held all the categories of the argumentative operations 
(claim, justification, consession, opposition, challenge).
— Too much opposition (rebuttals) was recorded. This is essential 
part of an academic controversy, which demands direct or 
indirect attacks and defends.
About justification structure we recorded the following categories:
l)indirect: (claim + justification) —y claim, 2) "response” to a cha­
llenge, 3) "response” to an opposition, 4) supporting an oppo­
sition and 5) need for a consensus.
The analysis employing the Walton scheme shows that pupils bring 
a great deal more to argumentation than are identified by strict ana­
lytical logical schemes. Presumptive reasoning analysis seem to be a 
natural entry point for the assessment and development of student’s 
argumentation strategies. Creating contexts and facilitating discourse 
that promote effective argumentation is a poorly understood element 
of science education. Augmentation of student’s discourse to promote 
critical thinking and reasoning would benefit by a shift from an emphasis 
on deductive and inductive argumentation schemes to an initial empha­
sis on the more natural dialog logic found in dialectical contexts.
Future research needs to be carried out on the content of argu­
mentation in natural settings like that in whole class, small group, 
and / or asynchronous computer contexts. Identification of the patterns 
of reasoning and argumentation schemes will facilitate and enrich our 
understanding of how to execute formative assessments of students 
reasoning from evidence to explanation.
We support that:
— Pupils can be able to make arguments through appropriate 
practice in discussing controversial topics.
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— Cooperative and controversial didactical strategies could sup­
port polysémie scientific reasoning and rich socio-scientific 
discourse.
— At first we believe that, despite the many obstacles and bar­
riers posed by the demands to implement different and inno­
vative practice, it is possible for primary teachers to adapt, 
change and develop their practice to one where there is a fun­
damental change in the nature of classroom discourse. Further­
more, pupils’ reasoning about the topic of cyclic and linear 
time was better after the academic controversy. Pupils who 
believed only in linear time and those who believed only in 
cyclic time recognized the necessity of a synthesis among the 
conflict opinions. It seems that so Toulmin’s asWatlon’s tool 
could work to pupils of 10-12 years under conditions. One of 
this is to familiarize puplis in argumentation for a long pe­
riod (at least a school year). Table 2 present the collapsed ca­
tegories of pupils’ arguments according to Walton’s schema fi­
gured on table l.We recorded more inferences which are ana­
lysed on special categories on table 3.
— In general we believe that pulpils after having a long practice 
in a) working in authentic environments, b) discussing contro­
versial topics and, c) following cooperative strategies; then 
they will manage to make rich arguments. They will manage 
to set rules and play roles in an argument game enriching their 
conversations and social interactions.
— Finally, an important factor in the whole procedure is teacher’s 
profile. Because a teacher who is not afraid of open environ­
ments could enhance his or her pupils to improve their ability 
in social - scientific argumentation.
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APPENDIX 1
Collapsed Categories from Walton’s Schemes 
Request for Information = Sign, Commitment, Position to Know 
Expert Opinion = Expert Opinion.
Inference = Evidence to Hypothesis, Correlation to Cause, Cause to 
Effect, Consequence.
Analogy = Analogy.
Table 1:
Argument from Definitions References
Request for 
Information = Sign, 
Commitment, 
Position to Know
Reference to spoken/written claims 
are used to infer the existence of a 
property or event.
Suggests action should be taken.
There is insufficient information to 
make a judgment. Involves request 
for more information.
Sign: References to the 
topic, "look at this" "it 
shows"
Commitment: Look for a 
request for action "should..” 
"could..."
Position to know: Look for 
opposition statement
Expert Opinion Reference to an expert source 
(person, text, group consensus, etc.) 
in order to support a claim
"the book says"
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lnference=Evidence Reference to premises followed by "1 think..." "it looks like..."
to Hypothesis, conclusion. Includes a hypothesis or "it probably would..." "if it
Correlation to a conjecture or generalizable had..."
Cause, Cause to prediction capable of being tested.
"then it would"Effect, (The hypothesis can come as part of
Consequences the "if or the "then" part of the (Often based on plausibility
Infer a causal connection between 
two events. Characterized by an
rather than probability.)
inferential leap, based on a natural 
law, but devoid of any reference to 
observational evidence.
" it will..."
Reference to premises that are 
causally linked to a non-controversial
"then it would be better"
effect. Effect is an observable 
outcome, with no need for testing.
Practical reasoning in which a policy 
or action is supported/rejected on the 
grounds that the consequences will 
be good/bad. A statement about the 
value of the conclusion without any 
expressed concerns for neither the 
properties nor the events that 
comprise the full argument.
"itis basically good"
Analogy Used to argue from one case that is 
said to be similar to another.
"like" or use of a metaphor
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